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 ABSTRACT 
 
MILITARY SPENDING MULTIPLIER OF TURKEY:  
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR TURKEY 
Serhat Kasalak 
Department of Management 
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Süheyla Özyıldırım 
July 2006 
 
This study estimates the military spending multiplier of Turkey over the period of 1980-
2004 by employing a four-equation econometric model. The different views that appear 
in the literature on the relationship between defense spending and economic growth are 
identified and it is concluded that there is no agreement as to the exact nature of the 
relationship between defense spending and growth. The study also deals with the current 
trends in Turkish economy, analyzes government spending and military spending of 
Turkey. The results of this study indicate that defense expenditures have no significant 
direct or indirect effect on economic growth. On the other hand, there is an insignificant 
positive military spending multiplier of 0.04. In other words, 1 percent increase in 
military expenditures results in a 0.04 percent (not statistically significant) increase in 
GNP.  
Keywords: Military expenditures, multiplier, Keynesian economics, peace dividend, 
economic growth. 
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 ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN ASKERİ HARCAMALAR ÇARPANI: 
TÜRKİYE İÇİN AMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA 
Serhat Kasalak 
Yüksek Lisans, İşletme Fakültesi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç.Dr. Süheyla Özyıldırım 
Temmuz 2006 
 
Bu çalışma, dörtlü-denklem ekonometrik modelini kullanarak, 1980-2004 yılları 
arasında Türkiye’de askeri harcamalar çarpanını ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. 
Literatürde savunma harcamaları ve ekonomik büyümeye etkisi hakkında yer alan 
çalışmalar incelenmiş ve ilişkinin yönü ve içeriği hakkında fikir birliğine varılamadığı 
görülmüştür. Çalışmada ayrıca Türkiye ekonomisindeki genel eğilimlere değinilmiş, ve 
kamu harcamaları ile askeri harcamalar analiz edilmiştir. Çalışma sonucunda askeri 
harcamaların istatistiksel olarak anlamlı doğrudan veya dolaylı bir etkisi olmadığı tespit 
edilmiştir. Öte yandan, istatistiksel olarak anlamlı olmayan 0.04 değerinde pozitif bir 
askeri harcama çarpanı bulunmuştur. Diğer bir ifadeyle, askeri harcamalarda yapılacak 
yüzde 1’lik bir artış, GSMH’da yüzde 0.04’lik bir büyümeye neden olmaktadır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Askeri harcamalar, çarpan, Keynesci ekonomi, barış kar payı, ekonomik 
büyüme.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In all macroeconomics classes and debates, ‘Keynesian Economics’ is one of the major 
topics of the content. As all economists know, Keynesian economics is an economic 
theory stating that active government intervention in the marketplace and monetary 
policy is the best method of ensuring economic growth and stability. A supporter of 
Keynesian economics believes it is the government's job to smooth out the bumps in 
business cycles. Intervention would come in the form of government spending and tax 
breaks in order to stimulate the economy, and government spending cuts and tax hikes in 
good times, in order to curb inflation (Investopedia, 2006). Additionally, a multiplier 
effect – or, more completely, the spending/income multiplier effect – occurs when a 
change in spending causes a disproportionate change in aggregate demand. The local 
multiplier effect specifically refers to the effect that spending has when it is circulated 
through a local economy. For example, when the building of a sports stadium is 
proposed, one of the suggested benefits is that it will raise income in the area by more 
than the amount spent on the project. (Wikipedia, 2006)  
Briefly, Keynesians believe that government spending has a multiplier effect on the 
economy. Determining fiscal multipliers or government spending multipliers is an 
important issue in economics literature. It will not be redundant to state that there is little 
consensus about the sign and the value of fiscal multipliers. The results change 
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according to the methods used, country selected and the time period studied. Even, there 
is little consensus among papers searching the same country. 
The main purpose of this paper is to find the military spending multiplier of Turkey. In 
other words, the study used data of Turkey from 1980 to 2004 in order to find if there is 
a multiplier effect of military spending in the economy. As a result three issues are 
investigated in order to find a reasonable solution: 
i. What is the direct effect of military expenditures on the GNP growth rate? 
ii. What are indirect effects of defense spending on the economic development? 
iii. What is the mechanism of defense spending and economic development 
interaction? 
The study uses the four-equation econometric model of Gyimah-Brempong (1989). The 
total effect of defense spending on economic growth is the sum of the direct effect on 
economic growth and indirect effects through channels in investment and availability of 
skilled labor. The model is formed to estimate the direct and indirect effects of military 
spending on economic growth.  
Empirical evidence highlights the stated conclusions below:  
i. There is not a statistically significant multiplier effect of defense spending on 
economic growth. This means that there is no relationship between defense 
spending and economic growth in Turkey. 
ii. There is an insignificant military spending multiplier of +0,041. The total 
effect of defense spending is positive on Turkish economic growth. 
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iii. The effects of military spending on investment and skilled labor formation are 
also insignificant.  
iv. Defense spending is mainly shaped by the total government expenditures, the 
prevention of terrorism act, military coups and other non-economic factors. 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explains the theoretical 
background. Keynesian economics, active fiscal policy, multiplier effect and peace 
dividend topics are notably stressed. Chapter 3 is a review of previous empirical studies 
dealing with military spending and economic development. Chapter 4 analyzes the 
current Turkish economic condition, government spending trend and military 
expenditures. The shares of government and military spending in GNP and the 
determinants of Turkish military spending are also studied. Chapter 5 explains the 
estimation method and the data used. Chapter 6 considers the regression results in detail. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1.  Keynesian Economics 
As it is stated in Wikipedia Encyclopedia (2006), Keynesian economics, also called 
Keynesianism, is an economic theory based on the ideas of an English Economist, John 
Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), as put forward in his book ‘The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money’, published in 1936 in response to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Keynesian economics promotes a mixed economy, where both 
the state and the private sector play an important role. The rise of Keynesianism marked 
the end of laissez-faire economics1. (Wikipedia, 2006) 
Keynesian economics is an economic theory stating that active government intervention 
in the marketplace and monetary policy is the best method of ensuring economic growth 
and stability. A supporter of Keynesian economics believes it is the government's job to 
smooth out the bumps in business cycles. Intervention would come in the form of 
government spending and tax breaks in order to stimulate the economy, and government 
spending cuts and tax hikes in good times, in order to curb inflation. (Investopedia, 
2006) 
In Keynes's theory, general (macro-level) trends can overwhelm the micro-level behavior of 
individuals. Instead of the economic process being based on continuous improvements in 
potential output, as most classical economics had believed from the late 1700s on, Keynes 
                                                 
1 Economic theory based on the belief that markets and the private sector could operate well on their own 
without state intervention. 
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asserted the importance of aggregate demand for goods as the driving factor of the economy, 
especially in periods of downturn. From this he argued that government policies could be 
used to promote demand at a macro level, to fight high unemployment and deflation of the 
sort seen during the 1930s. 
A central conclusion of Keynesian economics is that there is no strong automatic 
tendency for output and employment to move toward full employment levels. This, 
Keynes thought, conflicts with the tenets of classical economics, and those schools, such 
as supply-side economics or the Austrian School, which assume a general tendency 
towards equilibrium in a restrained money creation economy. In neoclassical economics, 
which combines Keynesian macro concepts with a micro foundation, the conditions of 
General equilibrium allow for price adjustment to achieve this goal. More broadly, 
Keynes saw this as a general theory, in which resource utilization could be high or low, 
whereas previous economics focused on the particular case of full utilization 
(Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
2.1.1. Historical Background 
John Maynard Keynes was one of a wave of thinkers who perceived increasing cracks in 
the assumptions and theories, which held sway at that time. Keynes questioned two of 
the dominant pillars of economic theory: the need for a solid basis for money, generally 
a gold standard, and the theory, expressed as Say's Law, which stated that decreases in 
demand would only cause price declines, rather than affecting real output and 
employment. In his political views, Keynes was no revolutionary. He was pro-business 
and pro-entrepreneur, but was very critical of rentiers and speculators, from a somewhat 
Fabian perspective. He was a "new" or modern liberal. 
 5
It was his experience with the Treaty of Versailles, which pushed him to make a break 
with previous theory. Keynes (1920) not only recounted the general economics, as he 
saw them, of the Treaty, but the individuals involved in making it. In the 1920s, Keynes 
published a series of books and articles, which focused on the effects of state power and 
large economic trends, developing the idea of monetary policy as something separate 
from merely maintaining currency against a fixed peg. He increasingly believed that 
economic systems would not automatically right themselves to attain "the optimal level 
of production." This is expressed in his famous quote, "In the long run, we are all dead", 
implying that it doesn't matter that optimal production levels are attained in the long run, 
because it would be a very long run indeed.  
In the late 1920s, the world economic system began to break down, after the shaky 
recovery that followed World War I. With the global drop in production, critics of the 
gold standard, market self-correction, and production-driven paradigms of economics 
moved to the fore. Dozens of different schools contended for influence. Some pointed to 
the Soviet Union as a successful planned economy, which had avoided the disasters of 
the capitalist world and even argued for a move toward socialism. Others pointed to the 
supposed success of fascism in Mussolini's Italy. 
Into this tumult stepped Keynes, promising not to institute revolution but to save 
capitalism. He circulated a simple thesis: there were more factories and transportation 
networks than could be used at the current ability of individuals to pay and that the 
problem was on the demand side. 
But many economists insisted that business confidence, not lack of demand, was the root 
of the problem, and that the correct course was to slash government expenditures and to 
cut wages to raise business confidence and willingness to hire unemployed workers. Yet 
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others simply argued that "nature would make its course," solving the Depression 
automatically by "shaking out" unneeded productive capacity (Wikipedia, 2006). 
  
2.1.2. Keynes and the Classics 
Keynes explained the level of output and employment in the economy as being 
determined by aggregate demand or effective demand. In a reversal of Say's Law, 
Keynes in essence argued that "man creates his own supply," up to the limit set by full 
employment. 
In "classical" economic theory—Keynes's term for the economics prior to General 
Theory (and specifically that of Arthur Pigou)—adjustments in prices would 
automatically make demand tend to the full employment level. Keynes, pointing to the 
sharp fall in employment and output in the early 1930s, argued that whatever the theory, 
this self-correcting process had not happened. 
In the neo-classical theory, the two main costs are those of labor and money. If there was 
more labor than demand for it, wages would fall until hiring began again. If there was 
too much saving, and not enough consumption, then interest rates would fall until either 
people cut saving or started borrowing. These two price adjustments would always 
enforce Say's Law, and therefore the economy would be at the optimal level of output 
(Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
2.1.3. Wages and Spending 
During the Great Depression, the classical theory defined economic collapse as simply a 
lost incentive to produce. Mass unemployment was caused only by high and rigid real 
wages. The proper solution was to cut wages. 
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Keynes argued that the determination of wages is more complicated. First, it is not real but 
nominal wages that are set in negotiations between employers and workers. It's not a barter 
relationship. Nominal wage cuts would be difficult to put into effect because of laws and 
contracts. Even classical economists admitted the existence of binding contracts and rules. 
Hence, Keynes argued that people would resist nominal wage reductions, even without 
unions, until they see other wages falling and a general fall of prices2. 
He also argued that boosting employment happens when real wages went down. More 
precisely, nominal wages have to fall more than prices. However, doing so would reduce 
consumer demand, and aggregate demand for goods. Business sales revenues and expected 
profits would decline. Investment would become more risky or less likely. Therefore, 
instead of raising business expectations, wage cuts could make matters much worse. 
Moreover, if wages and prices were falling, people would start to expect them to fall. 
Further, this could make the economy spiral downward as those who had money would 
simply wait as falling prices made it more valuable—rather than spending. As Irving 
Fisher argued in 1933, in his Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, deflation 
(falling prices) can make a depression deeper as falling prices and wages made pre-
existing nominal debts more valuable in real terms. 
 
2.1.4. Excessive Saving  
According to Keynes, excessive saving, i.e. saving beyond planned investment, was a 
serious problem encouraging recession even depression. Excessive saving results if 
investment falls, perhaps due to falling consumer demand, over-investment in earlier 
                                                 
2 His prediction that mass unemployment would be necessary to deflate sterling wages back to pre-war 
gold values had been proven right in the 1920s. 
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years, or pessimistic business expectations, and if saving does not immediately fall in 
step. 
 
Figure 1. Excessive Savings Mechanism 
Source: Wikipedia Encyclopedia (2006), Keynesian Economics. 
The classical economists argued that interest rates would fall due to the excess supply of 
“loanable funds”3. Assume that fixed investment in plant and equipment falls from "old 
I" to "new I" (step a). Second (step b), the resulting excess of saving causes interest-rate 
cuts, abolishing the excess supply: so again we have saving (S) equal to investment. The 
decline in interest rate prevents that of production and employment. 
Keynes had a complex argument against this laissez-faire response. The graph below 
summarizes his argument, assuming again that fixed investment falls (step A). Since the 
income and substitution effects of falling rates go in conflicting directions, saving does 
not fall as much as interest rates fall. Then, since planned fixed investment is mostly 
based on long-term expectations of future profitability, spending would not rise much as 
                                                 
3 For simplicity, other sources of the demand for or supply of funds are ignored here. 
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interest rates fall. Given the inelasticity of both demand and supply, a large interest-rate 
fall is needed to close the saving-investment gap seen from the figure. This requires a 
negative interest rate at equilibrium (where the new I line would intersect the old S line). 
However, this negative interest rate is not necessary to Keynes's argument. 
 
Figure 2. Interest Rate and Loanable Funds Mechanism 
Source: Wikipedia Encyclopedia (2006), Keynesian Economics. 
Keynes also argued that saving and investment are not the main determinants of interest 
rates, especially in the short run. Instead, the supply of and the demand for the stock of 
money determine interest rates in the short run. Neither change quickly in response to 
excessive saving to allow fast interest-rate adjustment. 
Finally, because of fear of capital losses on assets besides money, Keynes suggested that 
there may be a "liquidity trap" setting a floor under which interest rates cannot fall4. 
Even economists who reject this liquidity trap now realize that nominal interest rates 
                                                 
4 In this trap, bond-holders, fearing rises in interest rates (because rates are so low), fear capital losses on 
their bonds and thus try to sell them to attain money (liquidity). 
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cannot fall below zero (or slightly higher). In the diagram, the equilibrium suggested by 
the new I line and the old S line cannot be reached, so that excess saving persists5. Even 
if this "trap" does not exist, there is a fourth element to Keynes's critique (perhaps the 
most important part). Saving involves not spending all of one's income. It thus means 
insufficient demand for business output, unless it is balanced by other sources of 
demand, such as fixed investment. Thus, excessive saving corresponds to an unwanted 
accumulation of inventories, or what classical economists called a "general glut". This 
pile-up of unsold goods and materials encourages businesses to decrease both production 
and employment. This in turn lowers people's incomes—and saving, causing a leftward 
shift in the S line in the diagram (step B). For Keynes, the fall in income did most of the 
job ending excessive saving and allowing the loanable funds market to attain 
equilibrium. Instead of interest-rate adjustment solving the problem, a recession does so. 
Thus in the diagram, the interest-rate change is small. 
Whereas the classical economists assumed that the level of output and income was 
constant and given at any one time (except for short-lived deviations), Keynes saw this 
as the key variable that adjusted to equate saving and investment. 
Finally, a recession undermines the business incentive to engage in fixed investment. 
With falling incomes and demand for products, the desired demand for factories and 
equipment (not to mention housing) will fall. This accelerator effect would shift the I 
line to the left again, a change not shown in the diagram above. This recreates the 
problem of excessive saving and encourages the recession to continue. 
In sum, to Keynes there is interaction between excess supplies in different markets, as 
unemployment in labor markets encourages excessive saving—and vice-versa. Rather 
                                                 
5 Some (such as Paul Krugman) see this latter kind of liquidity trap as prevailing in Japan in the 1990s. 
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than prices adjusting to attain equilibrium, the main story is one of quantity adjustment 
allowing recessions and possible attainment of underemployment equilibrium 
(Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
2.1.5. Active Fiscal Policy 
As noted, the classicals wanted to balance the government budget, through slashing 
expenditures or (more rarely) raising taxes. To Keynes, this would exacerbate the 
underlying problem: following either policy would raise saving (broadly defined) and 
thus lower the demand for both products and labor. For example, Keynesians see US. 
president Herbert Hoover's June 1932 tax hike as making the Depression worse. 
Keynes's ideas influenced other US. president Franklin D. Roosevelt's view on the 
insufficient buying-power caused the Depression6. During his presidency, he adopted 
some aspects of Keynesian economics, especially after 1937, when, in the depths of the 
Depression, the United States suffered from recession yet again. Something similar to 
Keynesian expansionary policies had been applied earlier by both social-democratic 
Sweden and Nazi Germany. But to many the true success of Keynesian policy can be 
seen at the onset of World War II, which provided a kick to the world economy, 
removed uncertainty, and forced the rebuilding of destroyed capital. Keynesian ideas 
became almost official in social-democratic Europe after the war and in the U.S. in the 
1960s. 
                                                 
6 The Great Depression of 1929 was a worldwide economic downturn, starting in 1929 and lasting through 
most of the 1930s. It ended at different times in different countries. Almost all countries were affected. 
The worst hit were the most industrialized, including the United States, Germany, Britain, France, Canada, 
Australia, and Japan. Cities around the world were hit hard, especially those based on heavy industry. 
Construction virtually halted in the United States and other countries. Farmers and rural areas suffered as 
prices for crops fell by 40-60%. Mining and lumbering areas were perhaps the hardest hit because demand 
fell sharply and there was little alternative economic activity. 
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Keynes's theory suggested that active government policy could be effective in managing 
the economy. Rather than seeing unbalanced government budgets as wrong, Keynes 
advocated what has been called counter-cyclical fiscal policies, that is policies which 
acted against the tide of the business cycle: deficit spending when a nation's economy 
suffers from recession or when recovery is long-delayed and unemployment is 
persistently high—and the suppression of inflation in boom times by either increasing 
taxes or cutting back on government outlays. He argued that governments should solve 
short-term problems rather than waiting for market forces to self-correct. 
This contrasted with the classical and neoclassical economic analysis of fiscal policy. 
Fiscal stimulus (deficit spending) could actuate production. But to these schools, there 
was no reason to believe that this stimulation would outrun the side-effects that "crowd 
out" private investment: first, it would increase the demand for labor and raise wages, 
hurting profitability. Second, a government deficit increases the stock of government 
bonds, reducing their market price and encouraging high interest rates, making it more 
expensive for business to finance fixed investment. Thus, efforts to stimulate the 
economy would be self-defeating. Worse, it would be shifting resources away from 
productive use by the private sector to wasteful use by the government. 
The Keynesian response is that such fiscal policy is only appropriate when 
unemployment is persistently high, above natural level, "NAIRU". In that case, 
crowding out is minimal. Further, private investment can be "crowded in": fiscal 
stimulus raises the market for business output, raising cash flow and profitability, 
spurring business optimism. To Keynes, this accelerator effect meant that government 
and business could be complements rather than substitutes in this situation. Second, as 
the stimulus occurs, gross domestic product rises, raising the amount of saving, helping 
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to finance the increase in fixed investment. Finally, government outlays need not always 
be wasteful: government investment in public goods that will not be provided by profit-
seekers will encourage the private sector's growth. That is, government spending on such 
things as basic research, public health, education, and infrastructure could help the long-
term growth of potential output. 
Invoking public choice theory, classical and neoclassical economists doubt that the 
government will ever be this beneficial and suggest that its policies will typically be 
dominated by special interest groups, including the government bureaucracy. Thus, they 
use their political theory to reject Keynes' economic theory. 
In Keynes' theory, there must be significant slack in the labor market before fiscal 
expansion is justified. Both conservative and some neoliberal economists question this 
assumption, unless labor unions or the government "meddle" in the free market, creating 
persistent supply-side or classical unemployment. Their solution is to increase labor-
market flexibility, i.e., by cutting wages, busting unions, and deregulating business. 
It is important to distinguish between mere deficit spending and Keynesianism. 
Governments had long used deficits to finance wars. But Keynesian policy is not merely 
spending. Rather, it is the proposition that sometimes the economy needs active fiscal 
policy. Further, Keynesianism recommends counter-cyclical policies, for example 
raising taxes when there is abundant demand-side growth to cool the economy and to 
prevent inflation, even if there is a budget surplus. Classical economics, on the other 
hand, argues that one should cut taxes when there are budget surpluses, to return money 
to private hands. Because deficits grow during recessions, classicals call for cuts in 
outlays—or, less likely, tax hikes. On the other hand, Keynesianism encourages 
increased deficits during downturns. In the Keynesian view, the classical policy 
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exacerbates the business cycle. In the classical view, of course, Keynesianism is topsy-
turvy policy, almost literally fiscal madness (Wikipedia, 2006).  
 
2.1.6. Studies on the Effects of Active Fiscal Policy 
Many researchers have investigated the effectiveness of active fiscal policy. But, there is 
little consensus about the impact of active fiscal on the economy. Among many others, 
Blanchard & Perotti (1999) show that fiscal multipliers are usually small, often close to 1, 
and over a long period fiscal deficits largely crowd out private investment. Moreover, Perotti 
(2002) argues that the effectiveness of fiscal policy may have declined in the past two 
decades. Mohanty & Scatigna (2003) states that at low levels of public debt, fiscal policy 
generates the usual Keynesian effects. However, when the debt levels rise to some critical 
limit, fiscal policy has unconventional contractionary effects. They also show that one 
indicator of the relative role of fiscal policy in macroeconomic stabilisation is the share of 
the government sector in total demand. The study of Mountford & Uhlig (2005) points out 
that unanticipated deficit-financed tax cuts work as a (short-lived) stimulus to the economy, 
not that they are sensible. And they concluded that the resulting higher debt burdens may 
have long-term consequences which are far worse than the short-term increase in GDP. 
Perotti (2004) studies the effects of fiscal policy in OECD countries. He states that the 
estimated effects of fiscal policy on GDP tend to be small: positive government spending 
multipliers larger than 1 can be estimated only in the US in the post-1980 period. 
Dellas, Neusser & Walti (2005) searched the effects of fiscal policies in open 
economies. They showed that the macroeconomic effects of government spending 
shocks are greater, the lower the flexibility of the exchange rate and the smaller the 
degree of international capital mobility and the trade openness. The flexible price model 
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agrees with the latter two predictions but implies a weaker quantitatively relationship 
and moreover, it leaves no room for the exchange rate system to matter for fiscal policy 
(Dellas, Neusser & Walti, 2005). On the other hand, Obstfeld (1991) argues that if the 
government cannot commit itself to a low fiscal deficit, it may depreciate the local 
currency. Giorgianni (1997) also argues that in countries with large fiscal deficits, 
expansionary fiscal policies increase the likelihood of debt consolidation and depreciate 
the domestic currency through its risk premium. He provides empirical evidence for this 
with Italian data. Gali, Salido & Valles (2003) stress the effect of timing of taxation on 
fiscal policy. They state that if only distortionary labor and/or capital income taxes were 
available to the government, the response of the different macroeconomic variables to a 
government spending shock will generally differ from the one that obtains in the 
economy with lump-sum taxes, and will depend on the consumption and timing of the 
taxation. 
There are scarce studies searching the effects of active fiscal policy in Turkey. Agenor, 
McDermott & Ucer (1997) show that expansionary fiscal policy appreciates the temporary 
component of the real exchange rate for Turkey. Celasun, Denizer and He (1999) note a 
depreciation effect for Turkey. Fiscal policy affects the output through relative few 
transmission channels in Turkey compare to the US. Therefore, observing the effect of fiscal 
policy during a short period of time is reasonable (see Berument, 2003).  Berument (2003) 
shows that when expansionary fiscal policy is identified with positive innovations in auction 
interest rates, output and prices increase and local currency depreciates. 
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2.1.7. Automatic Stabilizers 
Automatic or built-in fiscal stabilizers refer to any element in the budget that acts to offset 
demand fluctuations by affecting government revenues and expenditures (see Auerbach & 
Feenberg (2000) and Cohen & Follette (2000)). These include all output-sensitive federal 
and state taxes as well as expenditures such as unemployment compensation benefits and 
other social security benefits that vary automatically with business cycles and without 
requiring prior legislative authorization (Mohanty & Scatigna, 2003).  
Automatic stabilizers are more effective if they reduce uncertainty about future income 
(insurance channel) and create a wealth effect when individuals believe that changes in tax 
revenues would not alter the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (wealth channel). 
Automatic stabilisers have strong effects if households face significant borrowing or 
liquidity constraints (liquidity channel). Empirical evidence confirms that a high proportion 
of liquidity-constrained households and a low degree of income inequality that allow tax 
changes to be more dispersed across different income brackets help to improve the impact of 
automatic stabilizers (Mohanty & Scatigna, 2003).  
“Empirical evidence shows that automatic stabilizers do not fully offset macroeconomic 
shocks so that discretionary action may add to the stabilizing potential. However, 
discretionary stabilizing actions suffer from considerable lags so that they appear to be badly 
timed and procyclical” (Capet, 2004). 
 
2.2. The "Multiplier Effect" and Interest Rates 
In economics, a multiplier effect – or, more completely, the spending/income multiplier 
effect – occurs when a change in spending causes a disproportionate change in aggregate 
demand. It is particularly associated with Keynesian economics; some other schools of 
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economic thought reject or downplay the importance of multiplier effects, particularly in 
the long run7 (Wikipedia, 2006).  
 
2.2.1. Keynesian multiplier 
Two aspects of Keynes's economic model had implications for multiplier effect policy: 
First, there is the "Keynesian multiplier", first developed by Richard F. Kahn in 1931. 
The effect on aggregate demand of any exogenous increase in spending, such as an 
increase in government outlays is a multiple of that increase—until potential is reached. 
Thus, a government could stimulate a great deal of new production with a modest 
outlay: if the government spends, the people who receive this money then spend most on 
consumption goods and save the rest. This extra spending allows businesses to hire more 
people and pay them, which in turn allows a further increase consumer spending. This 
process continues. At each step, the increase in spending is smaller than in the previous 
step, so that the multiplier process tapers off and allows the attainment of an 
equilibrium. This story is modified and moderated if we move beyond a "closed 
economy" and bring in the role of taxation: the rise in imports and tax payments at each 
step reduces the amount of induced consumer spending and the size of the multiplier 
effect. 
                                                 
7 The local multiplier effect specifically refers to the effect that spending has when it is circulated through 
a local economy. For example, when the building of a sports stadium is proposed, one of the suggested 
benefits is that it will raise income in the area by more than the amount spent on the project. 
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 Figure 3. The Simple Multiplier Process 
Source: Wikipedia Encyclopedia (2006), Multiplier Effect. (mpc: marginal propensity to 
consume) 
Second, Keynes analyzed the effect of the interest rate on investment. In the classical 
model, the supply of funds (saving) determined the amount of fixed business investment. 
To Keynes, the amount of investment was determined independently by long-term profit 
expectations and, to a lesser extent, the interest rate. The latter opens the possibility of 
regulating the economy through money supply changes, via monetary policy. Under 
conditions such as the Great Depression, Keynes argued that this approach would be 
relatively ineffective compared to fiscal policy. But during more "normal" times, 
monetary expansion can stimulate the economy, mostly by encouraging construction of 
new housing. 
 
2.2.2. Overview 
The basic assumption of the multiplier effect is that the economy starts off with unused 
resources, for example, that many workers are cyclically unemployed and much of 
industrial capacity is sitting idle or incompletely utilized. By increasing demand in the 
economy it is then possible to boost production. If the economy was already at full 
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employment, with only structural, frictional, or other supply-side types of 
unemployment, any attempt to boost demand would only lead to inflation. 
For various laissez-faire schools of economics, which embrace Say's Law and deny the 
possibility of Keynesian inefficiency and under-employment of resources, therefore, the 
multiplier concept is irrelevant or wrong-headed. 
As an example, consider the government increasing its expenditure on roads by $1 
million, without a corresponding increase in taxation. This sum would go to the road 
builders, who would hire more workers and distribute the money as wages and profits. 
The households receiving these incomes will save part of the money and spend the rest 
on consumer goods. These expenditures in turn will generate more jobs, wages, and 
profits, and so on with the income and spending circulating around the economy. 
The multiplier effect arises because of the induced increases in consumer spending 
which occur due to the increased incomes -- and because of the feedback into increasing 
business revenues, jobs, and income again. This process does not lead to an economic 
explosion not only because of the supply-side barriers at potential output (full 
employment) but because at each "round", the increase in consumer spending is less than 
the increase in consumer incomes. That is, the marginal propensity to consume (mpc) is 
less than one, so that each round some extra income goes into saving, leaking out of the 
cumulative process. Each increase in spending is thus smaller than that of the previous 
round, preventing an explosion (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
2.2.3. Details 
Here, the marginal propensity to consume equals: 
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mpc = ∆C/∆Yd 
Where C is consumer spending and Yd is consumer disposable income. 
If the multiplier process works as in a recession, the fall in demand creates its own 
unused resources, so that the basic assumption of the theory applies. 
The eventual amount by which output expands is governed by the marginal propensity to 
save, which is the proportion of extra income that is saved rather than consumed. If the 
marginal propensity to save is large, less money is returned into the economy with each 
circulation so the multiplier effect is smaller. The value of the multiplier in a closed 
economy with no taxes is given by 
mult = 1/(1 – mpc) = 1/s, s ≠ 0.  
Where s is the marginal propensity to save, i.e., the increase in consumer saving divided 
by the increase in consumer disposable income.  
In this simple model, the multiplier can be used to predict changes in GDP (Y)8 for a 
given change in spending, X. 
Predicted ∆Y = mult * ∆X  
Clearly, taxes and imports tend to reduce the value of the multiplier ("leakage"). With 
these, the spending/income multiplier process is more complex. 
mult = 1/mlr, mlr ≠ 0. 
where mlr is “marginal leakage rate”. 
This formula of the multiplier is obtained when we take into account the effects of all 
leakages. 
                                                 
8 Yd = Y only if taxes = 0. So, Yd: disposable income, Y: GDP. 
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The value of the multiplier is less than 1/s, since some of the demand stimulus or 
restraint leaks out to affect imports from the rest of the world and tax revenues. This 
weakening occurs because imports do not lead automatically to spending on the 
country's exports and increased tax revenues do not automatically cause increased 
government spending. Though this reduces the value of mult, it does not undermine the 
validity of the third equation above (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
2.3. Postwar Keynesianism 
After Keynes, Keynesian analysis was combined with classical economics to produce 
what is generally termed "the neoclassical synthesis" which dominates mainstream 
macroeconomic thought. Though it was widely held that there was no strong automatic 
tendency to full employment, many believed that if government policy were used to 
ensure it, the economy would behave as classical or neoclassical theory predicted. 
In the post-WWII years, Keynes's policy ideas were widely accepted. For the first time, 
governments prepared good quality economic statistics on an ongoing basis and a theory 
that told them what to do. In this era of new liberalism and social democracy, most 
western capitalist countries enjoyed low, stable unemployment and modest inflation. 
It was with John Hicks that Keynesian economics produced a clear model which policy-
makers could use to attempt to understand and control economic activity. This model, 
the IS-LM model is nearly as influential as Keynes' original analysis in determining 
actual policy and economics education. It relates aggregate demand and employment to 
three exogenous quantities, i.e., the amount of money in circulation, the government 
budget, and the state of business expectations. This model was very popular with 
economists after World War II because it could be understood in terms of general 
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equilibrium theory. This encouraged a much more static vision of macroeconomics than 
that described above. 
The second main part of a Keynesian policy-maker's theoretical apparatus was the 
Phillips curve. This curve, which was more of an empirical observation than a theory, 
indicated that increased employment, and decreased unemployment, implied increased 
inflation. Keynes had only predicted that falling unemployment would cause a higher 
price, not a higher inflation rate. Thus, the economist could use the IS-LM model to 
predict, for example, that an increase in the money supply would raise output and 
employment—and then use the Phillips curve to predict an increase in inflation. 
Through the 1950s, moderate degrees of government demand leading industrial 
development, and use of fiscal and monetary counter-cyclical policies continued, and 
reached a peak in the "go go" 1960s, where it seemed to many Keynesians that 
prosperity was now permanent. However, with the oil shock of 1973, and the economic 
problems of the 1970s, modern liberal economics began to fall out of favor. During this 
time, many economies experienced high and rising unemployment, coupled with high 
and rising inflation, contradicting the Phillips curve's prediction. This stagflation meant 
that both expansionary (anti-recession) and contractionary (anti-inflation) policies had to 
be applied simultaneously, a clear impossibility. This dilemma led to the rise of ideas 
based upon more classical analysis, including monetarism, supply-side economics and 
new classical economics. This produced a "policy bind" and the collapse of the 
Keynesian consensus on the economy (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 23
2.4. Military Keynesianism 
Military Keynesianism is a government economic policy in which the government 
devotes large amounts of spending to the military in an effort to increase economic 
growth. This is a specific variation on Keynesian economics.  
 
2.4.1. Economic Effects 
The economic impacts of military spending can be explained using four views: two on 
the demand side and two on the supply side. 
On the demand side, increased military demand for goods and services is generated 
directly by government spending. Secondly, this direct spending induces a multiplier 
effect of general consumer spending. These two effects are directly in line with general 
Keynesian economic doctrine. 
On the supply side, the maintenance of a standing army removes many workers, usually 
young males with less skills and education, from the civilian workforce. This 
demographic group ordinarily faces an especially high level of unemployment; some 
argue that drawing them into military service helps prevent crime or gang activity. In the 
United States, enlistment is touted as offering direct opportunities for education or skill 
acquisition, possibly to target this demographic. 
In this sense, the military might act as an employer of last resort – it is an employment 
opportunity which tends to hire from the bottom (least qualified) part of the workforce, 
provides a decent standard of living, serves a useful social purpose, and offers jobs 
regardless of the state of the general economy. 
Also on the supply side, it is often argued that military spending on research and 
development (R&D) increases the productivity of the civilian sector by generating new 
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infrastructure and advanced technology. Frequently cited examples of technology 
developed partly or wholly through military funding but later applied in civilian settings 
include radar, nuclear power, and the internet (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
2.4.2. Criticisms 
The primary criticism of military Keynesianism faults not its economic intuitions but 
adverse social effects. Many assert that the maintenance of large peacetime armies and 
growth of military spending will lead a nation into war, while also encouraging 
militarism and nationalism. These critics often attack the argument that the military 
prevents young men from sinking into crime by claiming that many soldiers who return 
from war are worse off physically or mentally than they would have been as an 
unemployed worker at home. 
A similar critique is military Keynesianism accelerates the growth of a military-
industrial complex – industrial sectors largely dependent on military spending. Because 
the military-industrial complex is a large employer and constitutes a significant fraction 
of aggregate demand, it is politically difficult for the government to reduce deficit 
spending. The end result of this, it is feared, is a cycle of constant war and continually 
high military spending. 
Other critics point out that while military R&D can sometimes find later application in 
civilian industries, it is less efficient than simply researching civilian applications 
directly. Many point to the recent examples of Japan and Germany, economies which 
have had great success in developing new technology despite low military spending 
compared to nations like the United States. 
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Finally, some critics, and even some supporters, contend that in the modern world, these 
policies are no longer viable for developed countries because military strength is now 
built on high-technology professional armies, and the military is thus no longer viable as 
a source of employment of last resort for uneducated young people (Wikipedia, 2006). 
 
2.4.3. Evidence of Military Keynesianism 
While the term was not in use at the time, the clearest historical example of military 
Keynesianism in action is usually acknowledged to be 1930s Germany, which rebuilt a 
crippled economy with enormous military production under a fascist government. This 
example illustrates both the potential positives of such policies in generating rapid 
growth, and also the negative social effects presented by critics. 
In today’s discourse, the term is most frequently discussed in relation to the United 
States, particularly the administration of President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. 
Reagan’s administration pushed for significant tax cuts, while increasing military 
spending to combat the Soviet Union. While this was in practice a policy suggestive of 
military Keynesianism, Reagan’s reasoning for the policy was not that it would spur 
economic growth, but that military spending was necessary to combat the threat of 
Communism. 
For many in the United States worried about the adoption of these economic policies, 
fears of this were somewhat averted by reduced military spending in the 1990s in what 
was commonly described as a peace dividend for the end of the Cold War. However, the 
War on Terrorism and War in Iraq have brought such concerns to prominence once more 
(Wikipedia, 2006). 
 26
2.5. Peace dividend 
The peace dividend is a political slogan purporting to describe the economic benefit of a 
decrease in defense spending. It is used primarily in discussions relating to the guns 
versus butter theory. The term was frequently used at the end of the Cold War, when 
many Western nations significantly cut military spending. 
The concept of a "peace dividend" assumes that the budget for defense spending will be at 
least partially redirected to social programs and/or economic growth. The existence of a 
peace dividend in real economies remains unproven. Most economies, in contrast, undergo a 
recession after the end of a major conflict as the economy is forced to adjust and retool 
(Wikipedia, 2006). Clements, Gupta, & Schiff (1996) claim that a sizable peace dividend 
was achieved from 1985 to 1996 in the World.  
In his study, Richard JOLLY (2003) states “In common with many other countries, the 
US marked the end of the Cold War with a rapid reduction in its military spending over 
the 1990s. At the same time however it cut government spending, leading many to argue 
that the promised ‘Peace Dividend’ had not materialized. A more considered analysis 
revealed, however, that the reduction in US military spending resulted in major 
reductions in the US government deficit and in interest rates over the 1990s. These 
reductions were major forces behind the growth of the US economy in the 1990s, 
helping to make it the longest lasting period of growth in US history. This growth in turn 
had a positive impact on the global economy – making the US the locomotive of the 
world economy, with actual and potential benefits to the poorest and lowest income 
countries. Had it not been for the ‘stop-go’ policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions 
and the disruptive effects of local conflicts encouraged by the arms trade, the positive 
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effects of reductions in US military expenditure would have been felt wider still across 
the developing world.” 
Davoodi, Clements, Schiff, & Debaere (2001) presents evidence that the easing of 
international and regional tensions is systematically related to subsequent reductions in 
military spending and the higher share of nonmilitary spending in total spending. They 
also state that peace is a public good; mutual reductions in military spending across 
borders have multiplier effects that are beneficial to all parties concerned. 
Klein (2002) focuses on the relationship between macroeconomic prosperity and peace 
effect. He states that “After the end of the Cold War, we (USA) entered a decade of 
extremely rapid and favorable expansion. Even though there was considerable reduction 
in defense spending and in the size of the military establishment the economy  of the US 
enjoyed a remarkable period of prosperity. From the point of view of economic analysis, 
the period of the ‘Peace Dividend’ showed why simplistic multiplier calculations of 
changes in government spending and the simultaneous changes in GDP do not, by 
themselves, show the underlying causal pattern of what is happening in the 
macroeconomy. The total economy consists of a very large number of interrelated 
sectors and variables and not just bivariate relationships between aggregate public 
spending and aggregate economic activity - surely not a reliable relationship between 
defense outlays and GDP alone.”  
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 CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1. Studies in the World 
Although many studies have investigated the relationship between defense spending and 
its effects on the economy, there is little that presents a Keynesian type military 
spending multiplier. And, there is no widely accepted conclusion about the effects of 
military expenditures on economy. The empirical studies focusing on military 
expenditures – economic growth relationship give conflicting results. What is more, 
there is no general belief about the effects of government spending on economy. The 
effectiveness of fiscal policy is also a common debate.  
The generally accepted starting point for much research in this area is Benoit’s study 
(1973) on the defense growth relationship. He applied a cross-section correlation 
analysis by using a single-equation model to 44 less developed countries (LDCs) for the 
period 1950 – 1965 and concludes that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between the amount of resources devoted to defense and economic growth. He also 
argues that the direction of causation is from defense spending to economic 
development, but not the other way around. His finding was criticized by many 
researchers in terms of his methodology, the analysis he made, and the data he used. 
Despite some of its drawbacks, Benoit’s study is regarded as one of the most important 
studies in this area.  
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Since then, the methodologies and data have been developed, and the frameworks of the 
models have been better established. However, in the defense economics literature, the 
issue of military expenditure and economic growth has not reached a clear-cut 
agreement yet. 
 
3.2.  Different Views on the Relationship Between Defense Spending and 
Economic Growth  
There is no widespread consensus about the relationship between defense spending and 
economic growth. Many researchers have investigated the link between these two 
phenomenon, but because of different perspectives and methodologies, never has a 
satisfactory consensus been acquired. The results of these researchers can be evaluated 
in three groups. The first group supports that defense spending has a positive effect on 
economic development. The relationship is significant and defense spending can be used 
as a successful fiscal policy device. The second group claims that the effects of military 
expenditures are negative on the economy. They also assert that defense burden uses the 
scarce resources of the economy and affects unfavorably. The third group supports that 
there is no direct and significant relationship between defense spending and economic 
growth. They support that military expenditures cannot be used as economic tools to 
achieve national prosperity. Some of these studies present a military spending multiplier 
– negative or positive –, while others only focus on defense-growth relationship and 
causality. The detailed conclusions that have been supported for each of these 
possibilities are reviewed below: 
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3.2.1. Defense Spending has Positive Effect on Economic Growth 
A group of scholars, Benoit (1973, 1978), Frederiksen & Looney (1983), and Weede 
(1986), employing single equation models and using data from a sample of LDCs, 
conclude that there is a positive and significant relationship between defense spending 
and economic growth. These authors have argued that the positive effects defense 
spending has on economic development stem from technological spin-off, skilled labor 
from the military, the modernization of attitudes the military fosters, the higher portion 
of R&D studies defense projects stimulates, and the employment of otherwise idle 
resources in defense related uses due to Keynesian-type demand effects. As a result, 
defense spending augments aggregate demand, enhances purchasing power, and causes 
positive side effects. Extra contracts arising from military affairs generate more jobs and 
increase the welfare of workers and suppliers. And this increased income will return to 
the economy cyclically. Through this increased process of increased demand and 
employment, military expenditures enhance economic growth (De Grasse, 1983). Using 
the Feder–Ram models, Ram (1986), Ateşoğlu & Mueller (1990) and Ward et al. (1991) 
found a positive impact of defense spending on economic growth. Dunne & Nikolaidou 
(2001) using Granger causality test with a VAR methodology to allow for cointegration 
between the variables showed a positive impact of military burden on growth in Greece.  
A positive effect of Turkish defense spending is supported by Sezgin (1997; 1999; 
2001), Yıldırım and Sezgin (2002), Candar (2003), Halıcıoğlu (2004), and Sezgin, 
Yıldırım and Öcal (2005). Sezgin (1997), employing a Feder–Ram model, found a 
positive effect. Sezgin (1999, 2001) using a Değer type model also showed a positive 
effect of military expenditures on growth. Yıldırım and Sezgin (2002) showed a positive 
impact of military expenditures on economic growth by using a non-theoretical VAR 
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model, which included real income, real savings, real military expenditure, labor force, 
and real balance of trade variables. Candar (2003) using cointegration analysis of Engle-
Granger (1987) two step procedure and the data over the period of 1950–2001 shows 
that military spending has a positive effect on economic growth in the long run as well 
as in the short run. The study of Halıcıoğlu (2004) provides an empirical relationship 
between the real Turkish defense spending and the real Turkish output by employing the 
new macroeconomic theory (Taylor, 2000) and the multivariate cointegration technique. 
Sezgin, Yıldırım and Öcal (2005) investigate the military expenditure economic–growth 
relationship for Middle Eastern countries and Turkey for the period 1989–1999 using 
cross-section and dynamic panel estimation techniques. They developed the model from 
Ward et al. (1991), which produces the final form of the Feder (1983) model with 
separate externality effects and factor productivity differentials of defense expenditure. 
They find that military expenditure enhances economic growth in the Middle Eastern 
countries and Turkey as a whole and the factor productivity differentials are positive: it 
implies that the defense sector is more productive than the civilian sector, probably 
because the defense sector uses high-technology compared with rest of economies in the 
Middle East.  
The first attempts of defense-growth relationship studies using Feder-Ram model in 
Turkey mostly find positive effects as it is criticized by Sandler & Hartley (1995, pp. 
206–209) who states that the Feder-Ram type model is inherently structured to find a 
positive impact of military expenditure on economic growth. 
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3.2.2. Defense Spending has Negative Effect on Economic Growth 
The set of studies including Lim (1983), Smith (1977), and Faini, Annez & Taylor 
(1984), using single equation models and data from LDCs in general, conclude that 
increased military expenditures results in decreased economic growth. These studies 
argue that increased defense spending decreases resources available for investment, and 
that this negative effect outweighs any direct positive effects defense spending has on 
economic development. Nabe (1983) constructs an iterative model in which economic 
development factors are made to depend upon defense; social development factors 
depend upon economic development factors and defense; economic growth rate in turn 
depends on economic development factors, defense and social development factors. 
Using data from a sample of African countries, he concludes that defense spending is 
negatively related to economic growth rate. Nabe’s model was criticized on its 
simultaneity problem and its transmission mechanism.  
Değer & Smith (1983) estimate a three equation simultaneous model. In their model 
equations for growth rate, savings, and defense burden are specified. Using data from a 
sample of LDCs, Değer & Smith find that defense spending has a significant negative 
effect on economic growth. They estimated the defense burden/growth rate multiplier as 
-0.26.  
Değer (1986) applies a three equation – economic growth, savings, and defense burden – 
simultaneous model to investigate the relationship between defense spending and 
economic growth, using data from a sample of LDCs. In her model, before estimating 
the system of equations, she applies single equation models to identify variables to be 
included in each equation. She finds a positive direct relationship between defense 
spending and economic growth. She attributes the result to Keynesian-type demand 
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effects, technological spin-off and modernization. However, she found that defense 
burden decreases savings rate and hence decreases economic growth. This negative 
indirect effect exceeds the direct positive effects. She estimated the defense 
burden/growth rate multiplier as -0.22. 
Lebovic and Ishaq (1987) examined defense-growth issue for 20 Middle Eastern 
countries, in the framework of a Keynesian demand model for the period 1973–1982. 
They developed a three-equation model employing panel data analysis and report a 
negative effect of military expenditure on economic growth. Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn 
(2003) investigated the causal relationship between military expenditure and economic 
growth for Egypt, Israel and Syria for the last three decades. They report that defense 
expenditures hinder economic growth for all three countries.  
Galvin (2003) applying cross-section data analyses with a demand and supply side 
model using simultaneous equation methodologies (2SLS and 3SLS) shows that defense 
spending has a negative impact on both the rate of economic growth and the savings-
income ratio in 64 developing economies. Yet the study also indicates that the effect is 
greater for middle-income nations, which may have less to gain from defense sector 
spill-overs. Her results also indicate that strategic factors, as much as economic 
constraints, determine defense spending in developing countries. 
With regard to the single demand-side equations, Smith (1980), Faini et al. (1984) and 
Rasler & Thomson (1998) showed a negative impact of military spending on growth. 
Also, regarding the single country analysis of military expenditure–economic growth 
relationship, DeRouen (2000) reports that military expenditure hinders economic growth 
in Israel. 
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Using the Granger–Causality analysis, Sezgin (2000) showed that there exists a negative 
impact of military expenditure on economic growth for Turkey. 
Finally, apart from a few countries, evidence from most of the simultaneous equation 
models indicates a negative impact of military expenditures on economic growth (Değer, 
1986; Antonakis, 1997). 
The results are also related with the model used. That is, as Candar (2003) states, in 
majority of the studies using demand and supply-side (Değer type) models, the 
relationship between defense spending and growth is negative (Değer & Smith 1983, 
Değer 1986, Lebovic & Ishaq 1987, Gyimah-Brempong 1989, Scheetz 1991, and 
Dortmans et al. 1995). 
 
3.2.3. Defense Spending has No Effect on Economic Growth 
Biswas & Ram (1986), using a single equation augmented neoclassical growth model, 
finds that defense spending has no significant effect on economic growth in their 
sample. They conclude that whether one finds a positive or a negative relationship 
between defense spending and economic development depends on the geographical 
coverage of the sample, the sample period, and model specification. 
Using the Feder–Ram models, Alexander (1990) and Huang & Mintz (1991) also 
concluded that there exists no relationship at all. 
Dakurah et al. (2001) using cointegration and error correction models for 62 countries 
found no common causal relationships between the military burden and economic 
growth. 
 35
Heo & Hahm (2004) using a multi-link defense-growth model based on macroeconomic 
theories while still accounting for political influences and empirically testing it with 
South Korean data for 1963-2001 showed that an increase in defense spending has a 
significant and delayed negative effect on private investment, employment, and export; 
and has no significant direct impact on growth. Özsoy (2000), employing a Feder–Ram 
model, showed that defense spending has no impact on economic growth in Turkey. 
Kelly & Rishi (2003) explore the spin-off effect controversy surrounding the role of 
military spending in economic development by investigating its impact on output in six 
industries linked to the military. Their results suggest that military spending's direct 
impact on output in each industry is negative or insignificant depending on whether 
adjustments for trade in armaments are made. The results also fail to substantiate 
physical and human capital spin-off effects. And they conclude that the case for spin-off 
effects has been exaggerated. 
Finally, it is noteworthy to state that most of the supply-side (Feder type) studies showed 
that defense spending has no significant impact on economic growth or a small positive 
effect (see Candar, 2003).  
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 CHAPTER 4 
TURKISH ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES 
 
4.1. Current State of the Turkish Economy 
Turkey is situated at the crossroads where two continents meet. She is among the 20 
largest economies of the world with her GDP of $361 billion in 2005, and in the position 
of the largest economy of Eastern Europe and the Middle East. 
The Turkish economy was re-modeled and became more outward looking with the 
structural adjustment program launched in the 1980s. The establishments of money and 
capital markets, the liberalization of exchange and interest rates and other prices have 
enhanced the effectiveness of monetary, fiscal and income policies. Liberalized import 
regime, new foreign investment and export promotion policies have enabled Turkey to 
take its place in the global economy. In this context, a serious economic growth has been 
accompanied by a significant change in the composition of the GNP; the share of 
industry, and particularly services, has marked an important increase.  
Turkey's dynamic economy is a complex mix of modern industry and commerce along 
with a traditional agriculture sector that still accounts for more than 35% of 
employment. It has a strong and rapidly growing private sector. The largest industrial 
sector is textiles and clothing, which accounts for one-third of industrial employment; it 
faces stiff competition in international markets with the end of the global quota system. 
However, other sectors, notably the automotive and electronics industries are rising in 
importance within Turkey's export mix. Real GNP growth has exceeded 6% in many 
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years, but this strong expansion has been interrupted by sharp declines in output in 1994, 
1999, and 20019. The economy is turning around with the implementation of economic 
reforms, and 2004 GDP growth reached over 9%. Inflation fell to 7.7% in 2005 - a 30-
year low.  
Prior to 2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Turkey averaged less than $1 billion 
annually, but further economic and judicial reforms and prospective EU membership are 
expected to boost FDI. Privatization sales are currently approaching $21 billion.10  
Turkey’s Gross National Product was $360.88 billion in 2005.  
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Figure 4. Turkish Gross National Product 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005.  
GNP per capita in 2005 was $5008 at current prices and $8475 in purchasing power 
parity. 
                                                 
9 State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005 
10 The World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2006 
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Figure 5. Turkish GNP per Capita 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005. 
GNP growth rates for the last four years were 7.9% in 2002, 5.9% in 2003, 9.9% in 2004 
and 7.6% in 2005.11  
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Figure 6. Turkish Gross National Product Growth Rates 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005 
                                                 
11 Turkish Statistical Institute, March 31st 2006 
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The main reasons behind the development are the structural reforms that have been put 
in place during the last four years, the strengthening of the economy's institutional 
structure and the introduction of a growth model focused on the private sector.  
GDP Compositions by Sectors
Agriculture
Industry
Services
 
Figure 7. GDP Compositions by Sectors in Turkey 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005 
GDP compositions by sectors are 11.7% in agriculture, 29.8% in industry and 58.5% in 
services in 2005. The population is estimated to reach 72.112 million in mid 2006. Total 
labor force of Turkey is 24.7 million in 2005. Shares of labor force by occupation are 
35.9% in agriculture, 22.8% in industry, and 41.2% in services according to third quarter 
of 2004. Unemployment rate is 11.8%, and underemployment is 4.2% in April 2006.  
Ratios of government budget deficits to GNP were, 16.2% in 2001, 14.2% in 2002, 
11.2% in 2003, 7.1% in 2004 and 2.0% in 2005.13 The main reason in this reduction is 
the tight fiscal discipline that was implemented since 2001. 
Inflation rates were 107.3% in 1994, 81.2% in 1997, 50.9% in 2000, 55.3% in 2001, 
44.4% in 2002, 22.5% in 2003, 9.5% in 2004 and 7.7% in 2005.  
                                                 
12 Turkish Statistical Institute. Last census was in 2000. Estimates are for Mid-Year population from 2000 
onward.  
13 Turkish Statistical Institute, Statistical Indicators 1923-2004, Ankara 2005 
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Figure 8. Inflation Trend in Turkey 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005 
The investment amount reached 20.3% of GNP in 2005. On the other hand, the foreign 
debt stock reached $170.1 billion in 2005. The foreign debt stock was standing at the 
$162.2 billion at the end of the previous year, which implies $7.8 billion of increase in 
2005. 
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 Figure 9. Foreign Debt Stock of Turkey 
Source: Turkish Central Bank, Database 2006. 
The rise in the foreign debt stock in 2005 stemmed solely from the rise in private 
sector’s debt stock, whereas the public sector’s debt stock declined considerably. More 
precisely, the private sector’s foreign debt stock surged by USD 19.9 billion in 2005, of 
which USD 6.2 billion was short-term debt and USD 13.7 billion was long-term debt. 
The foreign debt stock of the public sector, on the other hand, fell by $12.1 billion 
during the period under consideration. Although the foreign debt stock increased in 
nominal terms in 2005, it continued to decline as a ratio to the GDP. In fact, the foreign 
debt stock GDP ratio fell to 46.8% in 2005, compared to 53.6% in 2004. This ratio was 
as high as 78.2% in 2001. The decline in public sector’s debt stock during this period is 
even more impressive. The public sector’s foreign debt stock to GDP ratio fell to 22.9% 
in 2005, from 31.5% in 2004. As a result, the public sectors total debt stock (including 
the Central Bank) fell to the 75.5% of the GDP in 2005, compared to 83.9% a year ago. 
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The public sector’s total debt stock as a ratio to GDP was 127.5% in 2001, which 
indicates 52 percentage points decline in 4 years.14   
Since 2002, IMF-backed reform program has delivered a sustained improvement in 
economic performance. Despite outside shocks, financial market confidence has 
strengthened. Interest rates have declined significantly (from 70% to 14%) and Turkish 
lira has remained strong.  
In addition to fiscal discipline in recent years, the main objective of monetary policy 
over the course of the program was to reduce inflation towards EU levels. To mark the 
success in disinflation and strengthened confidence in the Turkish lira, in January-2005, 
Turkey introduced a new redenominated currency (dropping six zeros). The introduction 
of the new Turkish lira was extremely smooth, further enhancing policy credibility. 
On the other hand, there are some weak links in Turkish economy. Despite the strong 
economic gains in 2002-05, which were largely due to renewed investor interest in 
emerging markets, IMF backing, and tighter fiscal policy, the economy is still burdened 
by a high current account deficit. Trade deficit was $37,373 million in 2004, and 
increased by 25.3% to the amount of $43,076 million in 2005.  
                                                 
14 Yapi Kredi Bank A.S. Economic Research Department, Monthly Bulletin, April 2006 
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Figure 10. Trade Balance of Turkey 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005 
Additionally, current account deficit was $15,604 million in 2004. With a 48% increase, 
it reached to the amount of $23,09115 in 2005. The current account deficit reached 6.4% 
of GDP in 2005, boosted by the imported energy bill, which could increase by an 
estimated 1.5 percentage points of GDP for the year as a whole. Turkey had no difficulty 
in financing the large current account deficit and foreign reserves rose to the equivalent 
of 5.2 months of imports in 2005. However, short-term capital continues to be a 
significant part of these flows. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2005 has boomed and 
reached $9.6 billion on a cash-flow basis (2.6% of GDP). This is a notable improvement 
compared to past performance, when FDI inflows remained compressed to less than 1% 
of GDP, despite strong worldwide growth.16
                                                 
15 Turkish Central Bank, Database, 2006 
16 World Bank, Country Economic Memorandum 2006 
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In 2001-06 period, the reserves of Central Bank has increased by 313% and moved from 
a total of $18.7 billion in 2001 to $58.6 billion (March 2006).   
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Figure 11. Turkish Central Bank Reserves 
Source: Turkish Central Bank, Database 2006. 
 
4.2. Brief Analysis of Government Spending 
When Turkey was founded as a new country in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the 
country was in a state of destruction. All the resources and capital was used in the 
independence war or moved together with the minority foreign Ottoman residents 
such as Jews, Anatolian Greeks and Armenians. As a result, new state had found the 
recovery receipt by the interference of the government in the economic affairs. This 
was called as State Control on the economy, and had been placed as one of the 
principles of Atatürk. The main idea was: The government would fill the gaps in the 
economy till it is filled by private enterprises. With this policy, the government 
produced sugar, salt, cement, iron, steel, aluminum, paper, oil components, meat, 
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milk, clothing, chemicals, plastic, electric and etc. This policy has been actively used 
till the end of 1990s, when the privatization and the share of private enterprises and 
foreign capital fill the majority shares in Turkish economy.  
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Figure 12. Share of Turkish Government Spending in GNP 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005. 
When the above figure studied, it can be easily stated that the share of government 
expenditures has filled a steady share in Turkish GNP till year 1993. From year 1950 to 
year 1993, the amount has been dispersed between 14.19% (in 1968) to 23.95% (in 
1961). The average share from 1950 to 1992 is 17.86%. The steady trend was broken in 
year 1993 starting with a share of 24.29% in that year, and reaching to the peak point in 
2001 with the share 46.00%. The year 2001 can be regarded as the crisis year of Turkey. 
Huge current account deficit together with banking sector failures, have caused an 
above-expected crisis in the Turkish economy. It costs Turkey with a 46% government 
spending in GNP and a high cost foreign currency public debt. With the IMF assisted 
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recovery program, Turkey had managed to reduce the share from 46.0% in 2001 to 
35.29% in 200417.  
Government was the dominant factor from 1923 to 2001. The main idea was 
expansionary fiscal policy and direct state intervention in the economy in those years. 
After 2001 crisis, the fiscal policy changed radically. Since then, state has been applying 
a contractionary fiscal policy. The spendings are done in the limitations of the strict 
fiscal discipline. This fact is the main reason for the declining share of government 
spending in GNP.  
 
4.3. Analysis of Turkish Military Spending 
Turkey has a geopolitically and geo-strategically important position in the Middle East 
region, which forces her to allocate huge amount of budget to dissuasiveness and 
defense requirements. The Middle East has been one of the World’s most problematic 
areas. Although the general trend in the world is the reduction of defense budgets, 
average defense spending in the Middle East continues to increase.  
Till the collapse of Iron Curtain pact, Turkey was stated as the border country of NATO. 
Although both Turkey and Greece have been members of NATO, because of historical 
and positional reasons, both countries allocate huge amount of budget for arms 
procurement against each other. Distrustfulness and the awareness of high crisis risk in 
this region forces Turkey to form ready and strong armed forces.  
                                                 
17 It is noteworthy to state that the share of US’s government spending in GNP is around 20% in 2005. 
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Figure 13. Share of Military Expenditures in Government Spending 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005 and SIPRI 2005. 
The military expenditures of Turkey data can be obtained since 1950. Three significant 
changes can be seen from the table above: the first one is in 1968, from 14.64% to 
22.18%. The second one is in 1975, from 19.24% to 26.77%. And the last one is in 
1982, from 15.63% in 1979 to 27.96% in 1982. The change from 1974 to 1975 can be 
explained by the Cyprus peace operation. The up straight movement from 1979 to 1982 
can be explained by the military interference on September 12th, 1980 and military 
governance between 1980 and 1983. The period between 1967 and 1983 has a very 
highly cyclical character from the military expenditure shares point of view. From 1983 
to 2004, the trend has a very methodical downfall. What is more, it can be concluded 
that, the share of defense spending has decided its optimal amount since 2001, and has a 
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parallel movement towards then. The share of military expenditures has been dispersed 
between 10.89% (in 2001) and 27.96% (in 1982). 
As it is seen from the table that the years from 1984 to 2004, which has passed with the 
fight towards terrorism can be explained as the years that the military spending share has 
been steadily move downwards. This is contrary to the general belief that the fight with 
the terrorism has loaded a high military burden to the Turkish economy. As a result, the 
effect of the prevention of terrorism act will be analyzed in the empirical study.  
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Figure 14. Share of Military Expenditures in GNP 
Source: State Planning Organization, Economic Indicators 2005 and SIPRI 2005. 
Military spending has comprised on average 3.73% of GNP. Even though, the share has 
been dispersed between 2.88% in 1958 to 5.32% in 1999. The trend is steady between 
the period 1950 – 2004. The trend can be better understood when it is studied together 
with the overall government expenditures’ share in GNP.  
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4.3.1. Turkish Military Spending Trend  
Turkey has managed a successful fiscal program since 2001. The fiscal program, which 
was assisted by International Monetary Foundation (IMF), has been based on strict fiscal 
discipline. As mentioned before, she has reduced budget deficits and as a result reduced 
the real government debts. Parallel to this, military spending has been in a downward 
trend since 1999. The military spending trend was also affected from the fiscal discipline 
started in 2001.  
Turkey ranked the 14th in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 
“Major Spender Countries List” with a spending of $10.1 billion and a share of around 
1% of world military spending. When her spending was calculated with the purchasing 
power parity (PPP), Turkey ranked 11th in the same list.  
On the other hand, a decreasing trend in Turkish military expenditure is analyzed since 
1999. Both in dollar amount and GDP percentage, military spending has been decreased 
since 1999. It can be said that, Turkish military spending has a parallel trend in dollar 
terms starting from 2001. In 2004, because of the high GDP growth, the percentage was 
dropped to 3,9%. 
Military expenditure in constant (2003) US$ m. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
10008 10427 10926 12064 11675 10703 11388 10278 10142 
Military expenditure as percentage of gross domestic product 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
4,1 4,1 4,4 5,4 5 5 4,9 4,9 3,9 
Table 1. Military Expenditures of Turkey 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2005, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. 
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 Table 2. Major Spender Countries  
Military expenditure in MER dollar terms 
        
World 
share 
(%)   
Military expenditure in PPP 
dollar terms 
Rank Country Spending ($ b.) 
Spending 
Per Capita 
($) 
Spendi
ng 
Populati
on Rank Country Spending 
1 USA 455,3 1533 47 5 1 USA 455,3 
2 UK 47,4 798 5 1 2 China 161,1 
3 France 46,2 764 5 1 3 India 81,8 
4 Japan 42,4 332 4 2 4 Russia 66,1 
5 China 35,4 27 4 21 5 France 51,2 
Sub-
total, 
top 5   
626,7   64 29 Sub-total, 
top 5   
815,6 
6 Germany 33,9 411 3 1 6 UK. 46,2 
7 Italy 27,8 484 3 1 7 Germany 36,9 
8 Russia 19,4 136 2 2 8 Japan 35,2 
9 
Saudi 
Arabia 19,3 775 2 0 9 Italy 34,5 
10 
Korea, 
South 15,5 323 2 1 10 
Saudi 
Arabia 29,1 
Sub-
total, 
top 10   
742,5   76 35 Sub-total, 
top 10   
997,4 
11 India 15,1 14 2 17 11 Turkey 24,3 
12 Israel 10,7 1627 1 0 12 
Korea, 
South 23,1 
13 Canada 10,6 336 1 1 13 Brazil 20,7 
14 Turkey 10,1 140 1 1 14 Iran 18,5 
15 Australia 10,1 507 1 0 15 Pakistan 16,1 
Sub-
total, 
top 15   
799,2   82 54 Sub-total, 
top 15   
100,2 
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2005, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. 
 
4.3.2. Major Spender Countries In 2004 
The fifteen major spender countries spent about 82% of world military spending in 
2004. What is more, the top 5 countries account for about 64% of the total. The total 
spending of the major spenders is $800 billion, more than two times the Turkish GNP.  
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The highest spender –USA- spent nearly ten times more on defense requirements than 
the second highest spender –UK. It is noteworthy to state that USA spent around 23 
times more on defense than her ex-competitor Russia. 
Even though Turkey still keeps the developing country status with its accelerating 
economic performance, large trade and current account deficits, it still allocates a 
significant part of its resources for defense. Moreover, Turkey is also one of the leading 
arms importing countries in the world. Turkish defense spending shows some important 
characteristics.  
Although Turkish defense spending has a significant share in the Turkish economy, the 
demand for defense spending has not been extensively investigated. To my knowledge, 
there is one study by Sezgin & Yıldırım (2002), which presents an analysis of the 
determinants of the demand for Turkish military expenditure for the period 1949–1998, 
employing ARDL model approach to cointegration. They argued that the level of 
military expenditure is determined by five major factors: the influence of external 
conflicts; the requirements of internal security; domestic bureaucratic and budgetary 
factors; the influence of the armed forces themselves; the role of the major factors such 
as military coups, regimes and arms sales. 
These factors are all political and security related. Although political and military 
influences are quite important, the most crucial and central determinants of defense 
expenditure is budgetary, financial and resource constraints.  
In their study they found that Turkish defense expenditure is mainly determined by the 
defense expenditure of the allies (NATO) and that of enemies (Greece) in the shortrun. 
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However Greek defense spending does not have any significant effect on Turkish 
demand for defense spending in the long run, contrary to the spending of NATO. These 
results suggest that Turkey is in the follower mode considering the NATO defense 
expenditure and there does not seem to be an arms race or rivalry between Turkey and 
Greece in the long run. However, in the short-run, there may be an arms race between 
the two countries due to the Cyprus conflict. Moreover, the short-run estimates have a 
significant and high adjustment coefficient, indicating that economy quickly returns to 
its equilibrium level, once shocked. (see Sezgin &Yıldırım, 2002) 
 
4.3.3. Global Trends In Military Expenditures 
Overall world military spending in 2003 was increased by approximately 11% in real 
terms due to Iraq war, and increased terror. What is more, it was preceded by an increase 
of 6.5 per cent in 2002. In two years time, overall world military spending increased by 
around 18%, to reach $956 billion in 2003.  
Skons, Perdomo, Perlo-Freeman and Stalenheim (2004) analyzed the recent trends as 
follows: 
“High-income countries account for about 75% of world military spending but only 16 
per cent of world population. The combined military spending of these countries was 
slightly higher than the aggregate foreign debt of all low-income countries and 10 times 
higher than their combined levels of official development assistance in 2001. While it is 
not possible, because of a lack of data, to make the same comparison for 2003, it is clear 
that these gaps have widened owing to the stark rise in world military expenditure since 
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2001. Thus, there is a large gap between what countries are prepared to allocate for 
military means to provide security and maintain their global and regional power status, 
on the one hand, and to alleviate poverty and promote economic development, on the 
other. The main reason for the increase in world military spending is the massive 
increase in the United States, which accounts for almost half of the world total. After a 
decade of reductions in military expenditure in the period 1987–98 and moderate 
increases in 1998–2001, the changes in US military doctrine and strategy after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 unleashed huge increases in US military spending 
in 2002 and 2003. Much of the rise is accounted for by the large supplementary 
appropriations to cover the costs of the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
of anti-terrorist activities. In the absence of these appropriations, US military 
expenditure would still show a significant increase, but at a much slower rate, and world 
military spending would show a rise of 4 percent rather than 11 percent in 2003. While 
military expenditure is also rising in several other major countries, these increases are 
much smaller, and there is little indication that the strong increase in US military 
spending is resulting in an equally strong tendency for other countries to follow suit. It is 
difficult to assess the importance of US influence relative to more basic drivers of 
military spending, such as changing threat perceptions, increased global responsibilities 
and force projection, and the dynamics of military technology—in particular, since these 
factors are often strongly interlinked with the relevant countries’ relations with the USA. 
While all countries accept that no nation is currently able to match the USA in military 
power, there are other types of response that could impact on their military spending. A 
review of military expenditure trends in seven other major spenders shows that military 
expenditure has risen in most years of the five-year period 1999–2003 in all seven 
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countries. India and Japan have raised their military spending in line with their GDP 
growth. Apart from the two years 2001 and 2002, the same is true for China. In France 
and the UK, the military burden declined slightly in recent years, but in France it began 
to rise in 2003 and the burden is planned to increase in the UK. Brazil, unlike other 
medium-rank powers, is pursuing global influence using a model of ‘soft power’ rather 
than increased military expenditure. Its comfortable strategic position and enhanced 
trading relations have allowed a reallocation of scarce resources to economic and social 
development. During most of 2003, much of the focus in national military spending 
debates continued to be on the need to increase military spending to meet increasing 
dangers and risks in an increasingly complex and globalized world. However, towards 
the end of the year and in early 2004, there were several indications that other factors, 
related to the economic burden of the military sector and to ethical considerations, 
tended to increase in importance in several countries. In particular, the US doctrine of 
pre-emptive wars was being challenged on both ethical and international law grounds, as 
well as because of the large costs and dubious successes associated with it. Thus, while 
US military expenditure is set to continue to grow and will continue to propel world 
military spending, the pace is likely to fall back somewhat in the next few years. In the 
longer term it is doubtful whether current levels will be economically and politically 
sustainable. On the other hand, military expenditure in the Middle East increased by 
almost 10 per cent in 2003. Mainly two countries that share contiguous borders with Iraq 
caused the increase: Iran and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, the region’s biggest spender, 
increased its military expenditure only marginally. Israel, the region’s strongest military 
power, made a major policy decision in the light of events in Iraq to cut its military 
spending. Factors accounting for the limited impact of the war on military expenditure in 
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the region include the non-participation of many of the states in the war, the 
unpopularity of the war among the populations in the region, and their limited absorptive 
capacities for additional military equipment. Internal security is increasingly becoming a 
preoccupation of many states in the region because of the restiveness of their 
populations.” 
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 CHAPTER 5 
THE MODEL AND DATA 
 
5.1. The Model 
Though there is no general agreement on the effects increased defense spending has on 
economic development in general, and growth rate in particular, there is a general 
agreement among researchers that: (a) defense spending can potentially affect economic 
growth either directly through increased capacity utilization caused by Keynesian-type 
demand effects, the modernization of outlook, and technological spin-off, or indirectly 
through such channels as increased supply of skilled and managerial personnel to the 
economy; (b) economic growth rate, defense spending, and investment are determined 
separately.  
As Gyimah-Brempong (1989) states, any reasonable econometric model of the defense 
spending – economic growth relationship should therefore allow for:  
i. Direct effect of defense spending on economic growth, 
ii. Indirect effect through capital formation, skilled labor supply, and other 
externalities, and 
iii. Allow for the endogeneity of defense spending, economic growth, and the supply 
of skilled labor. 
Defense spending will influence economic growth in many ways. First, it is likely to 
influence growth through its impact on aggregate demand. As Keynesian analysis 
suggests, if aggregate demand is low relative to potential supply, increased defense 
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spending could lead to increased utilization of capacity. In addition to the short-term 
multiplier effects, such increased demand could lead to long-term economic growth 
since it leads to increased profit rate; hence investment and growth. However, this 
Keynesian-type demand effect is possible if defense spending is autonomous.  
A second way defense spending can influence economic growth is the creation of 
additional resources or improving the quality of existing resources. One of the scare 
resources in Turkey is skilled personnel. Benoit (1978) has argued that military training 
provides an easy way to increase a nation’s stock of managerial and technical skills. If 
defense spending increases the supply of such skills in an economy, it will increase 
economic growth indirectly through this supply of skills. 
Another resource that is influenced by defense spending is capital. Defense spending can 
crowd out investment in either productive capital or infrastructure, especially in LDCs 
where both private and public resources are extremely scarce. For any given amount of 
savings, the more that is devoted to defense, the less will be available for investment.  
The foregoing implies that economic growth will depend on defense spending, skilled 
labor, investment, and technology. However, these variables are not independent of each 
other. Most of these variables are endogenous.  
In this study, the defense – growth model à la Gyimah–Brempong (1989) is used. It is 
assumed that output (Y) is a function of capital (K), labor (L), defense (M), and 
technology (T). Formally: 
 (1)   Y = F (K, L, M, T) 
where Y = Gross National Product (GNP), K = Gross fixed investment, L = skilled 
labor, M = defense expenditure, and T = technological progress. 
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Taking the growth rates of the same variables, eqn (1) becomes: 
 (2)   y = f (k, l, m, t) 
where lower-case letters refer to growth rates of the variables defined above. 
Investment is not independent of other variables in eqn (2). The rate of capital formation 
is expected to be positively correlated with the level of output given the incremental 
capital-output ratio. Second, given any amount of resources, if a larger share is devoted 
to defense, there will be a smaller share left for all other things, including capital 
formation. On the other hand, it is hypothesized that increased security brought about by 
increased defense spending, all things equal, fosters optimism in the business 
community, leading to increased capital formation. In view of these possibilities, the 
following capital growth formulation is postulated: 
 (3)   k = k (y, m, Zk) 
where Zk is a vector of exogenous variables that influence investment growth. 
Benoit (1973, 1978), Weede (1986), and other researchers have argued that military 
training provides technical and managerial skills that are then imparted to the civilian 
economy. It is possible that increased defense spending will increase the supply of 
skilled personnel. However, increased defense spending could crowd out expenditure on 
education, leading to a reduction in the supply of skilled personnel to the economy. The 
net effect of these conflicting results cannot be determined theoretically. It is an 
empirical question to be determined. To allow for this possibility, it is postulated that:  
 (4)   l = l (m, Zl) 
where Zl is a vector of exogenous variables that influence growth of skilled labor. 
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Finally, defense spending does not only depend on security related factors, but on the 
ability to pay as well, and hence on the growth rate of the economy. 
 (5)   m = m (y, Zm) 
where Zm is a vector of exogenous variables that influence defense spending. Equations 
(2), (3), (4), and (5) form the system of equations to be estimated.  
Estimation of the system of equations requires us to provide specific functional forms 
for these equations and specify all the variables in the equation system. Economic theory 
does not provide any guide to the functional form for any of these equations. Hence, a 
linear (in parameters as well as variables) specification for the system of equations is 
chosen. The full equation system to be estimated is specified below: 
(2b)   y = a0 + a1 k + a2 l + a3 m + a4 XG + a5 CRS + a6 TECH 
(3b)   k = b0 + b1 m + b2 y + b3 DEP + b4 TB + b5 INF 
(4b)   l = c0 + c1 m + c2 EDUX + c3 SECED 
(5b)   m = d0 + d1 y + d2 COUP + d3 GOVX + d4 TERR 
 
where: 
y: annual growth rate of real GNP. 
k: annual growth rate of real gross fixed investment. 
m: annual growth rate of real defense spending. 
l: annual growth rate of skilled labor amount. Skilled labor is the gross labor force 
excluding agricultural labor force. 
XG: annual growth rate of real export earnings. 
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TECH: Technology. Annual electricity consumption is used as a proxy for the level of 
technology. 
CRS: economic crisis dummy, = 1 for the years 1980, 1994, 1999, and 2001. 
DEP: annual growth rate of total real deposits amount. 
TB: annual growth rate of real trade balance. 
INF: annual inflation rate. 
EDUX: annual growth rate of government expenditure on primary and secondary 
education. 
SECED: annual growth rate of the amount of students in secondary education. 
COUP: military coup dummy, = 1 for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982. 
GOVX: annual growth rate of real government expenditures. 
TERR: the prevention of terrorism act dummy, = 1 for the years beginning 1984. 
 
The growth equation (2b) includes the growth of export earnings (XG) and economic 
crisis (CRS) among other variables. Given the openness of Turkish economy and the 
dependence on export earnings, growth of export earnings is believed to be important in 
determining the growth rate of GNP. Since Turkish economy is very sensitive and 
responsive to economic crisis, crisis dummy is argued to be greatly influences industrial 
production in Turkey, but not part of the growth accounting identity.  
Annual electricity consumption (TECH) is included in the empirical model to represent 
technological growth for lack of a better formulation of technical progress. The 
coefficients of k, l, XG, and TECH are expected to be positive. The coefficient of CRS 
is expected to be negative. However, the coefficient of the growth of real defense 
spending (m) cannot be signed a priori (Gyimah-Brempong, 1989).  
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The growth rate of gross fixed investment (k) equation (3b) includes m, y, DEP, TB, and 
INF as regressors. Higher growth of gross income implies that there is more of GNP 
available for reinvestment. Also, total real deposits is included to show its positive effect 
on capital growth. The growth rate of trade deficit is also included to show the effects on 
investment. Turkey has had high inflation through most of 1980 – 2004 period. Inflation 
ratio is believed to affect negatively on the investment rate. y, and DEP are expected to 
have positive whereas INF is expected to have negative coefficients in the k equation. 
However, the coefficients of m, and TB cannot be signed a priori.  
The growth of skilled labor equation (4b) includes the growth rate of real government 
expenditure on education (EDUX), and the growth rate of the amount of students in 
secondary education. The higher the growth rate of public education expenditures, the 
higher the growth rate of population that is educated, and all things equal, is the growth 
rate of skilled personnel. It is also assumed that secondary education is an important 
aspect in skilled labor formation. If the Benoit hypothesis that military training imparts 
skilled personnel to the civilian economy is correct, then m is expected to have a 
positive coefficient together with EDUX and SECED.  
The growth of defense spending equation (5b) includes two resource variables – y and 
GOVX – two domestic security and order related dummy variables – COUP and TERR. 
Output growth (y) variable is intended to test whether higher gross income will lead to 
higher defense spending. On the other hand government expenditures (GOVX) is a 
factor of national income, but is the main source of defense budget. As a result an 
increase in government spending is expected to make a positive effect on military 
expenditures. The coup variable is intended to test the hypothesis that a successful coup 
leads to increased rate of defense spending. The last variable is TERR, which is intended 
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to test whether the fight with terrorism since 1984 has positive effects on the defense 
spending or not.  All of these coefficients y, GOVX, COUP, and TERR are expected to 
be positive.  
The total effect of defense spending on economic growth is the sum of the direct effect 
on economic growth and indirect effects through channels in investment and availability 
of skilled labor. Formally: 
  (6)   dy / dm = ∂y / ∂m + (∂y / ∂k) (∂k / ∂m) + (∂y / ∂l) (∂l / ∂m) 
The sign of dy/dm depends upon the signs and magnitudes of the three expressions on 
the right-hand side of (6). Even if ∂y / ∂m > 0, the sign of dy/dm is still indeterminate. 
Assuming that ∂y / ∂k, ∂y / ∂l > 0, either ∂k / ∂m, or ∂l / ∂m or both can be positive or 
negative, leaving the sign of dy/dm, and indeterminate. The sign of dy/dm, and hence 
the effects of defense spending on economic growth, is therefore an empirical question.  
 
5.2. Data 
5.2.1 Military Expenditure Data 
Military expenditure data of Turkey from 1950 to 2004 is available in Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database. The data used in this paper 
(1980 – 2004) is extracted from various issues of SIPRI year books. SIPRI data reflects 
the official data reported by governments. In order for the reader to judge the accuracy 
and reliability of military data, explanation of SIPRI about the sources, definition of 
military expenditure, and methods is reflected in Appendix A. 
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5.2.2 Other Data 
Data used in this study except military spending data has been gathered from State 
Planning Organization (SPO) and Turkish Statistical Institution (TSI). According to Sen 
(1995), using constant values is problematic because of the inadequate comparability of 
annual figures because of the effect of inflation.  Thus, all data are converted to 1987 
prices to acquire real figures. Some data definitions are stated below: 
EDUX: Annual growth rate of government expenditure covers the expenditures of 
Ministry of Education. The values exclude the expenditures of the Council of Higher 
Education. Source: State Planning Organization (SPO). 
l: Annual growth rate of skilled labor amount. Skilled labor is the gross labor force 
excluding agricultural labor force. The values are obtained by subtracting agricultural 
labor force from the total labor force. Source: SPO. 
All data refer to the 1980-2004 period because 1980 is the first year for many categories 
of data that are available.  All data are outlays in calendar years. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
 
6.1. Regression Results 
By using data from 1980 to 2004, the four equations are estimated using the two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure18. The results of the estimations are presented 
below: 
y = 0.0122 + 0.16 k + 0.154 l + 0.053 m + 0.008 XG – 0.071 CRS + 0.337 TECH           
  (0.78)*   (3.37)     (0.70)      (1.01)       (0.35)          (-3.94)          (1.87) 
 R2 = 0.88           
 F statistic = 22.4 
k = – 0.03 – 0.17 m + 1.85 y + 0.08 DEP + 0.02 TB – 0.01 INF   
  (-0.54) (-0.78)      (4.37)    (0.59)          (0.36)      (-0.15)   
                                                 
18 Two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) is a method of extending regression to cover models which 
violate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression's assumption of recursivity, specifically models where the 
researcher must assume that the disturbance term of the dependent variable is correlated with the cause(s) 
of the independent variable(s). Second, 2SLS is used for the same purpose to extend path analysis, except 
that in path models there may be multiple endogenous variables rather than a single dependent variable. 
Third, 2SLS is an alternative to maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) in estimating path parameters of 
non-recursive models with correlated error among the endogenous variables in structural equation 
modeling (SEM). Fourth, 2SLS can be used to test for selection bias in quasi-experimental studies 
involving a treatment group and a comparison group, in order to reject the hypothesis that self-selection or 
other forms of selection into the two groups accounts for differences in the dependent variable. 
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 R2 = 0.65          
 F statistic = 7.1 
 l = 0.023 + 0.014 m – 0.0015 EDUX + 0.079 SECED     
 (4.68)*   (0.25)       (-0.07)           (1.72)      
R2 = 0.14                  
F statistic = 1.09 
m = - 0.136 + 0.333 y + 0.272 COUP + 0.37 GOVX + 0.136 TERR                               
   (-1.61)   (1.15)       (2.73)          (2.61)          (1.69)    
R2 = 0.37                    
F statistic = 2.96 
(*)  Absolute values of t statistics in parenthesis 
In the GNP growth equation, the coefficients of investment growth, and technology are 
positive and significantly different from zero at the 0.10 significance level. Crisis has a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 0.001 significance level. Military 
spending growth, export earnings growth and skilled labor growth have positive but 
statistically insignificant coefficient. The positive but insignificant coefficient of growth 
rate of real defense spending (m) implies that it does not have any direct effect on 
economic growth in Turkey. This result is plausible since there is no lack of demand, but 
the problem is supply bottlenecks in Turkish economy.  
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In the investment growth equation, only the coefficient of GNP growth is statistically 
significant at 0.001 level and has a positive sign. This result shows that the investment 
amount and the national income is correlated and move together. A rise in one of them 
triggers a positive movement on the other. The coefficients of inflation rate, total 
deposits growth, trade balance growth and military expenditure growth are statistically 
insignificant at any reasonable rate. However, the signs of the coefficients are as 
expected; inflation rate and military expenditure growth has negative coefficients in the 
investment growth equation, whereas total deposits growth and trade balance growth has 
positive. The negative effect of defense spending on investment may be caused by 
resource drainage and this effect outweighs any positive influence that defense spending 
act on investment.  
In the skilled labor growth equation, only the coefficient of students in secondary 
education growth is statistically significant at the 0.10 level with a positive sign. This 
shows that, the higher the students have secondary education, the more the availability 
of skilled labor. On the other side, the coefficients of military spending growth and 
public education expenditures growth are not statistically significant at any reasonable 
level. However, although it is not significant, the positive sign of military spending 
coefficient shows the positive effect military training has on skilled labor formation as it 
is estimated a priori. This result is consistent with Benoit thesis that defense spending 
positively affects the availability of skilled labor to the economy. On the other side, the 
result is not parallel to Değer’s (1985) conclusion that military spending is negatively 
influencing skill formation.  
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In the military spending growth equation, the coefficients of terror dummy variable, 
military coup dummy variable, and growth of total government expenditures have 
positive signs and statistically different from zero at least at the 0.10 significance level. 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of growth of total government 
expenditures shows that military spending is dependent on the limitations of government 
expenditures and an increase in government expenditures triggers an increase in defense 
spending. The positive coefficient of terror reflects the effect of burden from the 
prevention of terrorism act. Also the positive coefficient of coup variable shows that the 
military coup periods increase military spending. However, the growth rate of GNP has 
a positive but insignificant coefficient. This may be interpreted as, military spending is 
independent from economic growth and not influenced at least in the short run.  
What is surprising is the fact that none of the military spending coefficients in any 
equation is statistically significant. This means that military spending does not directly 
affect any of GNP growth, investment growth or skilled labor growth.  
Gyimah-Brempong (1989) states the total effect of military spending – both direct and 
indirect effects – on growth rate of the economy as: 
dy / dm = ∂y / ∂m + (∂y / ∂k) (∂k / ∂m) + (∂y / ∂l) (∂l / ∂m) 
  = [a1 b1 + a2 c1 + a3] / [1 – a1 b2 – a3 d1] 
In order to calculate this multiplier, one needs to use statistically significant coefficients. 
In this equation, only a1 (coefficient of annual investment growth in the GNP growth 
equation) and b2 (coefficient of GNP growth in the investment growth equation) is 
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statistically different from zero at any reasonable significance level. And as it is stated 
before, none of military coefficients (a3, b1, c1) is statistically significant. There is not 
a statistically significant multiplier effect of defense spending on Turkish economy 
– directly or indirectly.  
This conclusion is consistent with the results obtained by Biswas & Ram (1986), 
Alexander (1990), Huang & Mintz (1991), Dakurah et al. (2001), Heo & Hahm (2004), 
Özsoy (2000), and Kelly & Rishi (2003) among others, who find no significant 
relationship between defense spending and economic growth. 
However, if the multiplier is calculated using insignificant coefficients, an average effect 
of +0.041 can be obtained. As a result of this fact, 1 percent increase in military 
expenditures results in a 0.04 percent (not statistically significant) increase in GNP. This 
result indicates that the total effect of defense spending on economic growth – though it 
is not statistically significant – is positive.  
This positive effect is partly consistent with the results obtained by Benoit (1973, 1978), 
Frederiksen & Looney (1983), Weede (1986), De Grasse (1983), Ram (1986), Ateşoğlu 
& Mueller (1990), Ward et al. (1991), Dunne & Nikolaidou (2001), Sezgin (1997; 1999; 
2001), Yıldırım and Sezgin (2002), Candar (2003), Halıcıoğlu (2004), and Sezgin, 
Yıldırım and Öcal (2005) among others, who find a positive relationship between 
defense spending and economic growth. 
However, it is not consistent with the results obtained by Smith (1977, 1980), Değer & 
Smith (1983), Lim (1983), Değer & Sen (1983), Nabe (1983), Faini, Annez & Taylor 
(1984), Değer (1986), Lebovic and Ishaq (1987), Rasler and Thomson (1998), DeRouen 
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(2000), Sezgin (2000), Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn (2003), and Galvin (2003) among 
others, who find a negative relationship between defense spending and economic 
growth. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study presents an analysis of the relationship between Turkish military spending 
and economic development for the time period 1980 – 2004, using a four-equation 
econometric model and two-stage least squares estimation method. The conclusions 
from the econometric analysis are that: 
i. There is not a statistically significant multiplier effect of defense spending on 
economic growth. This means that there is no relationship between defense 
spending and economic growth in Turkey. 
ii. There is an insignificant military spending multiplier of +0,041. The total effect 
of defense spending is positive on Turkish economic growth. 
iii. As a result of this fact, 1 percent increase in military expenditures results in a 
0.04 percent (not statistically significant) increase in GNP.  
iv. The effects of military spending on investment and skilled labor formation are 
also insignificant.  
v. Defense spending is mainly shaped by the total government expenditures, the 
prevention of terrorism act, military coups and other non-economic factors. 
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The conclusion from this study is consistent with those of studies that have found no 
relationship and partly consistent with those who have found positive relationship 
between defense spending and economic growth.  
Different methods of estimation for simultaneous-equation models have been proposed 
in the literature. These can be classified under the category of single-equation methods 
(alternatively called full-information methods) and system methods (alternatively called 
full-information methods), (see Maddala, 1977). In single equation methods, each 
equation is estimated separately using only the information about restrictions on the 
coefficients of that particular equation. The restrictions on the coefficients of the other 
equations are not used. They are (or should be) used to check the identifiability of the 
particular equation. But they are not used for estimation purposes. This is the reason 
these methods are called limited-information methods. In system methods, all equations 
are estimated jointly using the restrictions on the parameters of all the equations as well 
as the variances and covariances of the residuals. This is the reason they are called full-
information methods. Two-stage least squares method, which is used in this study, is the 
most commonly used single-equation estimation technique.  
This study used two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation method due to limited 
information. On the other hand, the four equations in this study may give more 
satisfactory results if they are estimated simultaneously. Because of the intercorrelations 
among the equations, error terms are likely to be correlated across equations. In order to 
comprise in the account of correlation of error terms across equations, the three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) estimation procedure may be a better alternative to estimate the 
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system, which is a full-information method. This may be a fruitful avenue for further 
studies. 
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 APPENDIX A 
SIPRI MILITARY EXPENDITURES DATA 
 
1. Sources19 
The sources for military expenditure data are, in order of priority: (a) primary sources, 
that is, official data provided by national governments, either in their official 
publications or in response to questionnaires; (b) secondary sources which quote primary 
data; and (c) other secondary sources. 
The first category consists of national budget documents, defence white papers and 
public finance statistics published by ministries of finance and of defence, central banks 
and national statistical offices. It also includes government responses to questionnaires 
about military expenditure sent out by SIPRI, the United Nations or the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
The second category includes international statistics, such as those produced by NATO 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Data for NATO countries are taken from 
NATO defence expenditure statistics as published in a number of NATO sources. Data 
for many developing countries are taken from the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics 
Yearbook, which provides a defence line for most of its member countries. This 
category also includes the publications of other organizations which provide proper 
                                                 
19 SIPRI year book, 2005 
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references to the primary sources used. The three main sources in this category are the 
Europa Yearbook (Europa Publications Ltd, London), Country Reports of the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (London), and Country Reports by IMF staff. 
The third category of sources consists of specialist journals and newspapers. 
 
2. Definition of military expenditure 
Although the lack of sufficiently detailed data makes it difficult to apply a common 
definition of military expenditure on a worldwide basis, SIPRI has adopted a definition, 
based on the NATO definition, as a guideline. Where possible, SIPRI military 
expenditure data include all current and capital expenditure on: (a) the armed forces, 
including peacekeeping forces; (b) defence ministries and other government agencies 
engaged in defence projects; (c) paramilitary forces, when judged to be trained and 
equipped for military operations; and (d) military space activities. Such expenditures 
should include: (a) military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of 
military personnel and social services for personnel; (b) operations and maintenance; (c) 
procurement; (d) military research and development; and (e) military aid (in the military 
expenditure of the donor country). Civil defence and current expenditures on previous 
military activities, such as veterans’ benefits, demobilization, conversion and weapon 
destruction are excluded. 
In practice it is not possible to apply this definition for all countries, since this would 
require much more detailed information than is available about what is included in 
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military budgets and off-budget military expenditure items. In many cases SIPRI cannot 
make independent estimates but is confined to using the national data provided. Priority 
is then given to the choice of a uniform definition over time for each country in order to 
achieve consistency over time, rather than to adjusting the figures for single years 
according to a common definition. In cases where it is impossible to use the same source 
and definition for all years, the percentage change between years in the deviant source is 
applied to the existing series in order to make the trend as accurate as possible. In the 
light of these difficulties, military expenditure data are not suitable for close comparison 
between individual countries and are more appropriately used for comparisons over 
time. 
 
3. Methods 
SIPRI data reflects the official data reported by governments. As a general rule, SIPRI 
takes national data to be accurate until there is convincing information to the contrary. 
Estimates are made primarily when the coverage of official data does not correspond to 
the SIPRI definition or when there are no consistent time series available. In the first 
case, estimates are made on the basis of an analysis of official government budget and 
expenditure accounts. The most comprehensive estimates, for China and Russia, have 
been presented in detail in previous Yearbooks. In the second case, differing time series 
are linked together. In order not to introduce assumptions into the military expenditure 
statistics, estimates are always based on empirical evidence and never based on 
assumptions nor extrapolations. Thus, no estimates are made for countries which do not 
release any official data. These countries are displayed without figures. (SIPRI, 2005) 
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 APPENDIX B 
THE DATA SET 
 
 y* m GOVX TERR TB 
YEAR GNP GROWTH  
MILITARY 
EXP. 
GROWTH 
GOVERNMENT 
EXP. GROWTH 
THE 
PREVENTION 
OF 
TERRORISM 
ACT 
TRADE 
BALANCE 
GROWTH 
1980 -2,78% 4,97% -4,71% 0 90,09% 
1981 4,81% 16,82% -2,63% 0 -15,00% 
1982 3,09% 11,47% -17,63% 0 -16,71% 
1983 4,21% -1,32% 29,46% 0 25,13% 
1984 7,11% -2,90% -2,49% 1 13,27% 
1985 4,30% 0,59% -8,17% 1 -13,18% 
1986 6,76% 11,52% 13,32% 1 2,61% 
1987 9,81% -0,65% 16,50% 1 4,10% 
1988 1,45% -9,87% -2,52% 1 -34,08% 
1989 1,63% 7,65% 3,23% 1 32,62% 
1990 9,37% 22,88% 12,02% 1 74,85% 
1991 0,35% 7,19% 21,80% 1 -19,92% 
1992 6,40% 9,42% 4,08% 1 10,36% 
1993 8,14% 9,73% 30,80% 1 64,93% 
1994 -6,08% -2,53% -10,77% 1 -52,21% 
1995 7,95% 3,12% 1,87% 1 124,30% 
1996 7,12% 13,47% 29,39% 1 44,59% 
1997 8,29% 6,67% 11,91% 1 12,48% 
1998 3,86% 10,37% 11,36% 1 -16,73% 
1999 -6,08% 16,91% 15,62% 1 -23,38% 
2000 6,34% -0,64% 10,81% 1 87,98% 
2001 -9,54% -8,87% 11,26% 1 -52,54% 
2002 7,94% 6,83% 0,02% 1 31,36% 
2003 5,87% -7,68% -2,19% 1 15,79% 
2004 9,86% -0,47% -1,55% 1 35,13% 
SOURCE: SIS, SPO       
* see page 60 and 61 for the definition of variable abbreviations. 
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  XG EDUX TECH CRS COUP 
YEAR 
EXPORT 
EARNINGS 
GROWTH 
EDUCATION 
EXP. 
GROWTH 
ELECTRICITY 
CONSUMPTION 
GROWTH 
CRISIS 
YEARS 
MILITARY 
COUP 
PERIODS 
1980 37,42% 5,56% 4,93% 1 1 
1981 62,34% 16,18% 6,77% 0 1 
1982 39,02% -1,39% 7,07% 0 1 
1983 10,14% 21,98% 3,72% 0 0 
1984 36,54% -20,45% 12,96% 0 0 
1985 3,66% -10,70% 7,50% 0 0 
1986 -10,78% -1,39% 8,42% 0 0 
1987 30,79% 12,54% 13,93% 0 0 
1988 11,97% 13,72% 8,24% 0 0 
1989 -15,20% -5,68% 8,56% 0 0 
1990 -13,05% 81,43% 8,58% 0 0 
1991 5,29% 10,67% 5,26% 0 0 
1992 9,16% 23,99% 9,54% 0 0 
1993 -0,39% 13,25% 9,73% 0 0 
1994 53,79% -21,09% 3,65% 1 0 
1995 -1,63% -22,38% 9,76% 0 0 
1996 7,05% 5,89% 10,03% 0 0 
1997 16,38% 9,55% 10,42% 0 0 
1998 0,66% 39,67% 7,11% 0 0 
1999 1,60% 9,17% 3,99% 1 0 
2000 3,48% 3,99% 7,78% 0 0 
2001 42,18% -25,52% -1,25% 1 0 
2002 -1,81% 31,10% 6,06% 0 0 
2003 6,45% 13,43% 8,57% 0 0 
2004 15,99% 13,71% 4,29% 0 0 
SOURCE: SIS, SPO       
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  k l DEP SECED INF 
YEAR 
GROSS 
FIXED 
INVESTMENT 
GROWTH 
SKILLED 
LABOR 
GROWTH 
TOTAL  
DEPOSITS 
GROWTH 
SECONDARY 
EDUCATION 
GROWTH 
ANNUAL 
INFLATION 
RATE 
1980 -1,75% 2,65% -9,07% 5,35% 89,63% 
1981 -4,79% -0,37% 40,30% 7,46% 44,34% 
1982 -0,21% 2,14% 21,72% 7,46% 28,31% 
1983 9,23% 3,82% 3,80% 7,46% 25,99% 
1984 3,03% 2,98% 8,76% 7,84% 48,55% 
1985 8,64% 2,45% 21,35% 5,34% 52,89% 
1986 20,94% 5,31% 11,44% 5,82% 35,62% 
1987 18,47% 5,26% 16,92% 6,57% 33,47% 
1988 7,71% -0,35% -5,18% 8,13% 69,73% 
1989 -12,45% 1,34% -5,67% 1,33% 75,48% 
1990 10,01% 1,49% -4,30% 3,93% 57,64% 
1991 4,94% 2,96% 12,68% 0,97% 59,17% 
1992 5,26% 6,34% 7,27% 6,28% 63,49% 
1993 21,52% -0,74% -4,21% 3,17% 67,36% 
1994 -12,57% 4,91% 23,26% 1,10% 107,27% 
1995 5,61% 1,08% 7,76% -0,56% 87,15% 
1996 12,16% 1,76% 33,98% -1,55% 78,00% 
1997 13,49% 3,57% 10,78% -13,26% 81,22% 
1998 -4,02% 3,08% 3,14% -11,09% 75,32% 
1999 -14,59% 4,71% 30,72% 21,41% 55,75% 
2000 9,71% 1,91% -7,47% 6,67% 50,88% 
2001 -24,61% 0,61% 20,61% -11,12% 55,33% 
2002 -1,72% 6,22% -12,40% 30,99% 44,38% 
2003 -1,47% 0,70% -7,68% -0,66% 22,50% 
2004 25,55% 2,51% 11,21% 0,80% 9,46% 
SOURCE: SIS, SPO       
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